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NOTES
COVERAGE OF BUILDING MAINTENANCE EMPLOYEES
UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACTS OF 1938:
CONSONANT with the spirit and broad language of the Fair Labor Stand-
ards Act,' which was designed to improve working conditions throughout
the country,2 has been the general extension of its coverage to maintenance
workers employed in buildings occupied by tenants engaged in the "produc-
tion of goods for [interstate] commerce." 3 The Act provides that an em-
* 10 East 40th Street Building, Inc. v. Callus, 65 Sup. Ct. 1227 (U. S. 1945), 8 WAGE &
HouR REP. 619; Opinion amended and rehearing denied (1945) 14 U. S. L. WEEr 3129;
Borden v. Borella, 65 Sup. Ct. 1223 (U. S. 1945), 8 WAGE & HOUR REP. 621.
1. 52 STAT. 1060 (1938), 29 U.S. C. §§ 201-19 (1940).
2. The FLSA was designed as an instrument of national policy, using the federal com-
merce power as a vehicle, to alleviate the lot of more than ten million underprivileged vork-
ers by the establishment of minimum wage and maximum hour scales. Perhaps the hest
summary of the evils which led to the passage of the Act is found in § 2, which reads: "(a)
The Congress hereby finds that the enistence, in industries engaged in commerce or in the
production of goods for commerce, of labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the
minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of work-
ers (1) causes commerce and the channels and instrumentalities of commerce to be used to
spread and perpetuate such labor conditions among the workers of the several States; (2)
burdens commerce and the free flow of goods in commerce; (3) constitutes an unfair method
of competition in commerce; (4) leads to labor disputes burdening and obstructing com-
merce and the free flow of goods in commerce; and (5) interferes with the orderly and fair
marketing of goods in commerce." For discussions of the background and legislative hictory
of the Act see de Vyver, Regulation of Wages and Hours Prior to 1938 (1939) 6 L&w a Con-
TEMP. PROB. 323; Douglas and Hackman, The Fair Labor Standards Act of 193S I (1933)
53 PoE. Sci. Q. 491. For a comprehensive study of the number of workers covered by the
Act see Daugherty, The Economic Coverage of the Fair Labor Standards Act: A Statistical
Study (1939) 6 LAw & CO.;TEP. PROB. 406. For a discussion of some of the economic
factors underlying the Act see Nathan, Favorable Economic Implications of the Fair Lator
Standards Ac (1939) 6 LAw & CoNraziP. PROD. 416.
3. Kirschbaum v. Walling, 316 U. S. 517 (1942); Borden v. Borella, 65 Sup. Ct. 1223
(U. S. 1945), 8 WAGE & HOUR REP. 621; Fleming -. Post, 146 F. (2d) 441 (C. C. A. 2d,
1944); Merryfield v. Hoyt Shoe Corp., 128 F. (2d) 452 (C. C. A. 1st, 1942); Gangi v. Schulte,
150 F. (2d) 694 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945); Baldwin v. Emigrant Industrial Savings Banh, 150 F.
(2d) 524 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945); Cahn v. Butler Building Corporation, 7 V,AGE & Houn REP.
1086 (N. D. I1. 1944); Bittner v. Chicago Daily News Printing Co., 7 WAc;E & Hour REP.
1123 (N. D. Ill. 1944); Frank v. AlclMeekan, 56 F. Supp. 369 (E. D. N. Y. 1944); Schmidt v.
Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank, 7 WAE & HOUR REP. 623 (S. D. N. Y. 1944); Berry v.
34 Irving Place Corp., 52 F. Supp. 875 (S. D. N. Y. 1943); Gelles v. Xewburgh Savings
Bank, 7 WAGE & HOUR REP. 431 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1944); Rienzo v. City BanI: Farmera
Trust Co., 7 WAGE & HouR REP. 713 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1944); O'Donnell v. City Bank Farm-
ers Trust Co., 7 WAGE & HOUR REP. 932 (N. Y. City Ct. 1944); Schinecl: Y. 386 Fourth
Ave. Corp., 49 N. Y. S. (2d) 872 (N. Y. City Ct. 1944); Floyd v. SS-64 Fortieth Street Corp.,
44 N. Y. S. (2d) 422 (N. Y. City Ct. 1943). In addition to building maintenance employees,
the courts have held employees working as cooks, clerks, and watchmen covered by the Act.
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ployer must pay prescribed minimum wages and compensation for overtime
"to each of his employees who is engaged . . ." in such production; 4 and
states that employees are "deemed" to be so engaged if they are employed
"in any process or occupation necessary" to "production." "Production"
is defined by the Statute as meaning "produced, manufactured, mined,
handled, or in any other manner worked on." 5
The Supreme Court has evolved two rules in the application of this statute
to maintenance workers. It was first held that where processing or manu-
facturing by either owners or tenants. takes place upon the premises, main-
tenance workers have a sufficiently close relation to production to be covered
by the Act.6 Later, a correlative doctrine developed that if goods are not
For a discussion of "employees not in the physical process of production" and a collection
of the cases see Davisson, Coverage of the Fair Labor Standards Act (1943) 41 Mica. L. REV.
1060, 1078-81, (1945) 43 MicE. L. REV. 867, 892-7.
4. Section 206(a) provides: "Every employer shall pay to each of his employees who
is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce wages at the following
rates-(l) during the first year from the effective date of this section, not less than 25 cents
an hour, (2) during the next six years from such date, not less than 30 cents an hour. .... .
Section 207(a) states: "No employer shall, except as otherwise provided in this section,
employ any of his employees who is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for
commerce-for a workweek longer than forty-four hours during the first year from the
effective date of this section, (2) for a workweek longer than forty-two hours during the
second year from such date, or (3) for a workweek longer than forty hours after the expira-
tion of the second year from such date, unless such employee receives compensation for his
employment in excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one and one-half
times the regular rate at which he is employed."
Two distinct criteria have been developed for the purpose of determiniiig coverage
under the Act, one applicable to employees "engaged in commerce" and the other applicable
to employees "engaged in the production of goods for commerce." The test laid down for
employees "engaged in commerce" in the leading case of McLeod v. Threlkeld, 319 U. S.
491,497 (1943) was "not whether the employee's activities affect or indirectly relate to inter-
state commerce but whether they are actually in or so closely related to the movement of the
commerce as to be a part of it." It has uniformly been held that building maintenance em-
ployees do not meet this test, and can only come within the scope of the Act if they are en-
gaged in occupations "necessary to the production of goods for [interstate] commerce."
See 10 E. 40th Street Building v. Callus, 65 Sup. Ct. 1227 (U. S. 1945), 8 WAGE & HOUR
REP. 619. For decisions holding that building maintenance workers, employed in buildings
the tenants of which are engaged in interstate commerce, do not come within the provisions
of the Statute, see Johnson v. Dallas Downtown Development Co., 132 F. (2d) 287 (C. C. A.
5th, 1942); Johnson v. Masonic Building Co., 138 F. (2d) 817 (C. C. A. 5th, 1943); Cochran
v. Florida National Building Corp., 45 F. Supp. 830 (S. D. Fla. 1942); Tate v. Empire Build-
ing Corp., 5 WAGE & HouR REP. 475 (E. D. Tenn. 1942). TheSupreme Court in effect affirmed
these decisions when it denied certiorari in the Johnson case, 321 U. S. 780 (1944). The
Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division has deplored this dual standard, however,
See 5 WAGE & HOUR REP. 813; Wage & Hour Division release R-1890, October 17, 1942.
5. Section 203(j) provides: " 'Produced' means produced, manufactured, mined,
handled, or in any other manner worked on in any State; and for the purposes of this chapter
an employee shall be deemed to have been engaged in the production of goods if such em-
ployee was employed in producing, manufacturing, mining, handling, transporting, or in any
other manner working on such goods, or in any process or occupation necessary to the pro-
duction thereof, in any State."
6. Kirschbaum v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517 (1942), see note 3 supra.
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physically handled in the building, such maintenance employees will be
protected if their employer is engaged in interstate business, but not when
tenants are taking part in interstate activity and the employer merely
operates the building
The manufacturing test was first applied by the Court in 1942 in Kirsch-
baum v. Walling s In that case maintenance employees of a loft building,
whose tenants engaged principally in manufacturing, buying, and selling of
clothing, were held necessary to the production of goods for interstate com-
merce within the meaning of the Act, on the theory that the tenants could
not produce without the light, heat, and power provided by the workers.
The test based upon the nature of the employer's business was evolved in
two recent cases decided the same day. In Borden v. Borella o the laborers
were employed in an office building owned and largely occupied by the
Borden Company, an interstate producer of milk products. No processing,
handling or manufacturing took place within the building, but it contained
the executive offices from which the Borden enterprise was controlled. In
holding the maintenance workers were engaged in occupations necessary to
the "production of goods for commerce" and were protected by the Act,
Mr. Justice Murphy, writing for the majority, stressed the usual test of the
relation of the employees to "production," 10 which the Court held included
management as well as manufacturing. Mr. Justice Frankfurter concurred
in the result."
But in the companion case, zo East 4oth St. v. Calhls,IC the tenants, in-
stead of the owner, were engaged in interstate activity,13 preparing nationally
circulated magazines for publication, designing posters and displays for a
large out-of-state lithographer, operating sales agencies for mining and
manufacturing firms, writing and distributing publicity releases for national
concerns, "handling" and repairing machines for customers in different
states, and supervising plants "manufacturing" goods for interstate com-
merce. The employer merely operated the building. The Second Circuit
Court of Appeals ' 4 held for the maintenance workers on the theory that a
substantial part i5 of the building was occupied by firms "producing" goods
7. Borden v. Borella, 65 Sup. Ct. 1223 (U. S. 1945), 3 NVAGE & Houn ReP. 621; 10
East 40th Street Building, Inc. v. Callus, 65 Sup. Ct. 1227 (U. S. 1945), S WAGE a HoUR
REP. 619.
S. 316U.S. 517 (1942).
9. 65 Sup. Ct. 1223 (U. S. 1945), S WVAoE a Houn REP. 621.
10. "And since the respondent maintenance employees stand in the came reltion to
this production as did the maintenance workers in the Kirzchbaum case, it follow.s that they
are engaged in occupations 'necessary' to such production, thereby qualifying for the bane-
fits of the Fair Labor Standards Act." Id. at 1225, 3 WA.G & HouR REP. 622.
11. Id. at 1226, 8 WAGE & HouR REP. 623.
12. 65 Sup. Ct. 1227 (U. S. 1945), 8 WGE & HoUR REP. 619.
13. See Callus v. 10 East 40th Street Building, Inc., 146 F. (2d) 438 (C. C. A. 2d, 1914).
14. Ibid.
15. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has suggested that courts adopt the Adminis-
trator's criterion of enforcement, based on 20% of the space occupied, as their test of sb-
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for commerce. In an opinion by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, the Supreme
Court reversed, rejecting the reasoning of the Borden case, stressing the fact
that the owners of the building were not engaged in interstate commerce. 10
While manufacturing by either owners or tenants would extend the Act to
maintenance workers under the Kirschbaum case, the Callus and Borden
holdings seem to mean that where the activity in the building is something
removed from physical processing of goods, such as managing or advertising,
the maintenance workers will only be protected if such interstate activity is
done by their direct employer.
Prior to the Callus case, however, it was generally understood that the
relation of the individual employees to "production" rather than the nature
stantiality. The Administrator, however, has cautioned against setting up such a standard
since many cases have held that a "much smaller proportion of interstate business may
suffice to bring employees engaged in occupations necessary to such business within the
scope of the Act." Brief for the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division, as amicus
curiae, p. 17, n. 8, 10 East 40th Street Building v. Callus, 65 Sup. Ct. 1227 (U. S. 1945),
8 WAGE & HOUR REP. 619 (1945). Employees have been covered under the Act when less
than 1 per cent of the employer's business was devoted to interstate business. In the follow-
ing cases, cited in the amicus brief at 28, footnote 14, in which the proportion of the em-
ployer's business moving in interstate commerce varied from 4% to less than 1%, the
employees were held to be covered by the Act: Sun Publishing Co. v. Walling, 140 F. (2d)
445 (C. C. A. 6th, 1944), cert. denied, 322 U. S. 728 (1944); Davis v. Goodman Lumber Co.,
133 F. (2d) 52 (C. C. A. 4th, 1943); New Mexico Public Service Co. v. Engel, 145 F. (2d) 636
(C. C. A. 10th, 1944); Schmidt v. Peoples Telephone Union of Maryville, Mo., 138 F. (2d)
13 (C. C. A. 8th, 1943); Strand v. Garden Valley Telephone Co., 51 F. Supp. 898 (D. Minn.
1943); Cooper v. Gas Corp. of Michigan, 4 WAGE & HOUR REP. 550 (C. C. Mich. 1941);
Steger v. Beard & Stone Elec. Co., 4 WAGE & HOUR REP. 411 (N. D. Tex. 1941); Lewis v.
Nailling, 36 F. Supp. 187 (W. D. Tenn. 1940); Fleming v. Lowell Sun Co., 36 F. Supp. 320
(D. Mass. 1940), rev'd on other grounds, 120 F. (2d) 213 (C. C. A. 1st, 1941), aff'd without
opinion, 315 U. S. 784 (1942); Ling v. Currier Lumber Co., 50 F. Supp. 204 (E. D. Mich.
1943).
The press release announcing the Administrator's enforcement policy reads: "In view
of recent decisions of the courts in'employee suits brought by maintenance employees in
office and bank buildings, L. Metcalfe Walling, the Administrator of the Wage and Hour
and Public Contracts Divisions, announced today that until the courts indicated that the
act applied, or until further notice, he would take no further enforcement action under the
wage and hour provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, with respect to maintenance
employees in buildings in which less than 20 percent of the space is occupied by firms en-
gaged there or elsewhere in the production of goods for commerce. He also stated that, in the
interests of simplicity and uniformity in the application of this policy, for the present he
would not include in the computation of the 20 percent banking firms or other firms whose
interstate activities are limited to the preparation and transmission of documents, communi-
cations or correspondence, although in his opinion such activities involve production of
goods for commerce as defined in the Fair Labor Standards Act and of course involve en-
gaging in commerce." See PR-19 (rev.) WAGE & HouR DivisioN, November 19, 1943,
contained in the amicus brief cited supra note 15 at 33-4.
16. "But an office building exclusively devoted to the purpose of housing all the usual
miscellany of offices has many differences in the practical affairs of life from .. .the office
building of a manufacturer." 10 East 40th Street Building v. Callus, 65 Sup. Ct. 1227, 1230
(U. S. 1945), 8 WAGE & HoUR REP. 619, 620.
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of the employer's business was the test for protection by the statuteY' In
fact, as first drafted, the Act made the nature of the employer's enterprise
the test of coverage for his employees, 8 but in its final form the employees'
duties ' 9 were adopted as the criterion: the workers were to be protected if
engaged in any process or occupation necessary to the production of goods
for commerce. "Necessary" has been construed to mean "convenient"
rather than "indispensable." The administrator has said,:  "the benefits of
the statute are extended to such employees as maintenance workers, watch-
men, clerks, stenographers, messengers, all of whom must be considered as
engaged in processes or occupations 'necessary to the production' of goods.
Enterprises cannot operate without such employees. If they were not doing
work 'necessary to the production' of the goods they would not be on the
payroll." In addition, "production" has been given an equally broad mean-
ing by the courts and the administrator. Under the test advocated by the
administrator 21 and sanctioned by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals,: if
20 percent of the space in the building is being used for production, main-
tenance workers are covered by the Act.
As this test of the relation of the employees to production was used in the
Kirschbaum decision, it was apparently intended to apply to interstate
activities other than manufacturing. Instead of limiting its holding to
manufacturing, the Court wrote in the disjunctive: "Practically all of the
tenants manufacture or buy and sell ladies' garments." 2 In any event, the
clear implication of the opinion is that the Court intended no such limitation,
but used "manufacturing" only as a component part of the broader statutory
definition of "production," i.e. "produced, manufactured, mined, handled
or in any other manner worked on." 24 Clearly, therefore, a substantial
percentage of the 10 E. 40th St. tenants were engaged in "production" ac-
17. See Kirschbaum v. Walling, 316 U. S. 517 (1942); Fleming v. Post, 146 F. (2d) 441
(C. C. A. 2d, 1944); Cahm v. Butler, 7 WAGE & HoUR REP. 1086 (D. D. Ill. 1944); Frank v.
McMeekan, 7 WAGE & HoUR R~e. 328 (E. D. N. Y. 1944); see Daviszon, Cbr--rage cf the
Fair Labor Standards Act (1945) 43 MicH. L. REv. 867.
18. For a comparison of the original Senate bill, S 2473, and the House bill, HR 7200
(75th Congress, 1st Session, 1937) with the conference report which was finally enacted, cce
83 CoNG. REc. 9246 (1938), especially at 9252 where the question of coverage is diccuzzcd.
See also Cooper, The Coerage of the Fair Labor Standards Act and Other -Proa fs in Its
Interpretation (1939) 6 LAW & CoNTrmp. PRoD. 333, 338-9; (1944) 29 IowA L. REv. C06,
610; and Administrator's Interpretative Bull. No. 1 (issued Sept. 22, 1938) 1941 WAGE a
Hour MAN. 27, par. 1.
19. "Every employer shall pay to each of his employees who is engaged in commerce
or in the production of goods for commerce .... " 52 STAT. 1062 (1938), 29 U. S. C. § 200a
(1940).
20. See Administrator's Interpretative Bull. No. 1, id. at 28, par. 5.
21. See note 15 s pra.
22. See 10 East 40th Street Building, Inc. v. Callus, 146 F. (2d) 438, 440 (C. C. A. 2d,
1944). "The Division's 20% standard seems to us a sensible one for the courts to adopt."
23. Kirschbaum v. Walling, 316 U. S. 517, 518-9 (1942). (Italics Supplied).
24. See note 5 supra.
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cording to' the meaning suggested by the language of the Kirschbaum deci-
sion.
It was upon this test of coverage that Mr. Justice Murphy based his
decision in the Borden and his dissent in the Callus case.2" Under the ma-
jority opinion in the latter decision it is still necessary to apply the criterion
of the workers' relation to production, but it is only applied in the non-
manufacturing cases after the test of the employer's occupation has been
met.
In addition to limiting the coverage of the FLSA, the Callus decision has
given rise to confusion in the lower courts. For example, Roberg v. Phipps
Estate,2 on the authority of the Callus decision, denied coverage to main-
tenance workers employed in buildings where actual "manufacturing" was
taking place.Y The District Court decided that although no manufacturing
was carried on at 10 East 40th Street, the reasoning used by the Supreme
Court in the Callus case was applicable. 2 This appears to be an unwarranted
25. 10 East 40th Street Building v. Callus, 65 Sup. Ct. 1227, 1230 (U. S. 1945), 8
WAGE & HOUR REP. 619, 620.
26. Robergv. Phipps Estate, 8 WAGE & HOUR REP. 771 (S. D. N.Y. 1945).
27. Eleven and one-half percent of the rentable area was devoted to manufacturing
goods for interstate commerce. The District Court decided this was too small a percentage
to satisfy their test of substantiality. Eleven and one-half percent of the rentable space might
be enough to satisfy the substantiality requirement. "As was said in the E ngl case, an
employee's interstate activities are sufficiently substantial to bring him within the scope
of the Act if such activities constitute 'a part of the work-a-day duties of the employee,'
and his contribution to production is 'both consistent and continuous,' 'not merely sporadic
and isolated.' (145 F. 2d at 640). No reason appears why this principle should not ap-
ply to maintenance employees performing service indiscriminately for tenants who engage
in production of goods for commerce and for tenants who do not. In all cases where the
interstate and intrastate business is commingled, the problem is to determine whether
the interstate aspects are substantial, or merely incidental and inconsequential. The prob-
lem here does not differ in substance from that of employees in a factory producing goods
only a fraction of which is intended for shipment in interstate commerce. In such cases,'
while the proportion of goods shipped in commerce may be regarded as some indication
of the substantiality of the employee's interstate activities, it is recognized that no flat
percentage standard can be applied. In some cases the proportion of interstate business
has been as low as a fraction of 1%, but nevertheless has been held substantial enough
to bring within the Act employees whose regular day-to-day duties relate indiscriminately
to the interstate as well as the intrastate business." Amicus brief cited supra note 15, at 27-9.
28. Roberg v. Phipps Estate, Inc., 8 WAGE & HOUR RrP. 771, 773 (S. D. N. Y. 1945),
opinion modified in 8 WAGE & HOUR REP. 885 (S. D. N. Y. 1945) to conform to Judge
Clark's opinion in the Baldwin v. Emigrant Savings Bank case cited supra n. 29. The Dis-
trict Court in its first opinion found that 35,920 square feet or eleven and one-half percent
of the rentable area was occupied by firms engaged in the production of goods for commerce.
On the basis of what Judge Clark said constituted production of goods for commerce, the
court was compelled to add 25,385 square feet to its original estimate and hence obtained a
total of 61,305 square feet. This total, however, according to the court, still fell 695 feet
short of the twenty percent required by the Administrator, since there was rental area of
310,000 square feet. But as has been pointed out the Administrator's standard is not the
absolute minimum required for coverage (see notes 15 and 17 infra) and is merely an ad-
ministrative rule of thumb. The Administrator would undoubtedly recommend that the
employees of the Roberg case be covered.
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conclusion, as the language of the majority in the Callus opinion clearly
affirms the Kirschbaum decision and indicates it would have reached a
different result if enough of the tenants of the 10 East 40th Street building
had been engaged in the manufacturing of goods for commerce. Thus it
seems the Court in the Roberg case would have been compelled to reach a
different result had it recognized the employer test of the Callus opinion as
an alternative criterion, in addition to the usual production tests of the
l3orden and Kirschbaun decisions.
By contrast, in Baldwin v. Emigrant Tndustrial Savings Banh,o the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted the Callus decision as establishing the
doctrine that there must be "actual physical production" of goods on the
premises before maintenance workers can be covered by the Act,-'  and held
that "handling" constituted such "physical production." This holding,
which recognized that the employer-occupation test was not relevant where
physical production took place within the building, seems to interpret the
Callus case more correctly than the Roberg decision.
As Mr. Justice Frankfurter suggested, in the Callus case the Court was
endeavoring to draw a practical line which was "bound to appear arbitrary
when judged solely by bordering cases." 31 In defense of this stand, he
pointed out this task was put upon the courts, and not upon a legislative or
administrative group, since Congress failed to exhaust its power over com-
merce by establishing adequate statutory criteria, or by creating an expert
administrative group.
3 2
Such arguments, however, do not answer the objection that the particular
line was not wisely drawn. The pre-Callus cases indicated that the relation
of the particular employee to production, and not the employer's occupa-
tion, controlled. The introduction of a second test seems a needless com-
plication. In fact, six of the nine Justices maintained consistent positions
in the Borden and Callus cases on the application of the older doctrine of the
relation of the employee to production. In both the Bordcn and Callus deci-
sions, Justices Murphy, Black, Reed, and Rutledge voted to extend the
protection of the Act to maintenance employees where interstate activity,
but no physical handling of goods, took place within the building; e3 and in
both cases the Chief Justice, and Mr. Justice Roberts were against extending
the Act to the workers. Only Justices Frankfurter, Jackson, and Douglas
changed their position for the Callus case,34 at the same time introducing
29. 150 F. (2d) 524 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945), cerl. denid 66 Sup. Ct. 171 (U.S. 1945).
30. Id. at 525.
31. 10 East 40th Street Building, Inc. v. Callus, 65 Sup. Ct. 1227, 1230 (U. S. 19-45),
S WAGE & HouR REP. 619, 620.
32. Id. at 1229, 8 WAGE & HOUR REP. at 619. Compare his language in Kirmchbaum v.
Walling, 316 U. S. 517, 523 (1942).
33. These four were joined by Justices Frankfurter, Jackson, and Douglas to make a
7-2 majority.
34. The changing over of the three gave the 5-4 margin against the v.orl:er in the
Calus case.
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the employer-occupation test. Since this latter criterion was not stressed by
any opinion in the Borden decision, and is apparently advanced by only
three Justices, it is at least possible that it will not play a major role in future
cases.
As a matter of policy it would seem consistent with the spirit of the FLSA
to extend its coverage as widely as the commerce power will allow. 36 This
can best be done by continued liberal interpretation of the terms "necessary"
and "production" and by repudiation of doctrinal limitations such as the
employer-occupation test.
38
PRESS ASSOCIATIONS AND RESTRAINT OF TRADE*
Wmt, it is well established that the newspaper industry is within the
ambit of the Sherman Act,' it has long been a question to what extent the
practices of newspaper publishers are subject to its provisions. 2 The recent
35. "It is clear that the purpose of the Act was to extend federal control in this field
throughout the farthest reaches of the channels of interstate commerce." Walling v. Jack-
sonville Paper Co., 317 U. S. 564, 567 (1943).
36. Five identical bills are pending in Congress at the present time which would raise
the FLSA minimum wage to 65 cents, 75 cents after two years, provide higher minima for
other than unskilled jobs, and extend coverage of the Act. See 8 WAGE & HOUR REP.
729-32 for a discussion of proposed amendments. Impetus has been given to this contem-
plated legislation by President Truman's recent message to Congress, the concluding portion
of which reads: "I therefore recommend that the Congress amend the Fair Labor Standards
Act by substantially increasing the minimum wage specified therein to a level which will
eliminate substandards of living, and assure the maintenance of the health, efficiency, and
general well-being of workers. The scope of the Fair Labor Standards Act also should be
clarified and extended. In view of changes which have occurred since 1938, I believe it is
no longer necessary to exclude from the minimum wage program the large number of work-
ers engaged in agricultural processing who are now excluded. There now exists a twilight
zone in which some workers are covered, and others, doing similar work, are not. Extension
of coverage would benefit both workers and employers, by removing competitive inequities.
Our achievements in this field during the last seven years of establishing minimum wages
have been gratifying; but we must continue to move forward, step by step." 8 WAoE &
HOUR REP. 891-892.
* Associated Press et al. v. United States; Tribune Co. et al. v. Same; United States v.
Associated Press et al. (three cases decided together), 65 Sup. Ct. 1416 (U. S. 1945), aff'g 52
F. Supp. 362 (S. D. N. Y. 1943), rehearing denied, (1945) 14 U. S. L. VEEK 3129.
1. See Associated Press v. National Labor Relations Board, 301 U. S. 103, 125-9,
132-3 (1937); Indiana Farmer's Guide Publishing Co. v. Prairie Farmer Publishing Co., 293
U. S. 268 (1934).
2. See Inter-Ocean Publishing Co. v. Associated Press, 184 Ill. 438, 56 N. E. 822
(1900); International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U. S. 215 (1918). The INS
case established that AP and other coperative associations are engaged in business for
profit. This was affirmed in American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U. S. 519, 528
(1943).
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Associated Press 3 case 4 indicates that a co6perative news service may not
deny applicants access to its facilities solely because of their competitive
relation to existing members.
Charging a combination and conspiracy in restraint of trade and com-
merce and an attempt to monopolize within the meaning of the Sherman
Act,5 the government, in an injunction proceeding, challenged as restrictive
and exclusionary the membership by-laws 0 of the defendant association, a
co6perative, non-profit agency for the gathering and interchange of newsY
On motion for summary judgment,' a special three-judge District Court 0
concluded that the by-laws relating to requirements for admission to mem-
bership 10 were, on their face, illegal restraints of interstate trade in news.
Their continued enforcement was enjoined with directions to amend them
so that established members in the same city and "field" 1 should not have
the power to impose or dispense with conditions upon admission, and so
that such by-laws state affirmatively that competitive considerations 12 will
be disregarded in passing upon applicants.13 The court did not attempt,
however, to interfere with AP's employment of other criteria in selecting its
members. The by-law proscribing communication by members of "spot"
news 14 and AP news dispatches to non-members or to rival news agencies
was held to be illegal only when considered in conjunction with the admis-
3. Hereinafter called AP.
4. 65 Sup. Ct. 1416 (U. S. 1945).
5. 26 STAT. 209 (1S90), 15 U.S. C. §§ 1, 2 (1940).
6. A summary of the history of AP's by-laws is contained in the majority opinion of
the Supreme Court. See 65 Sup. Ct. 1416, 1418-20 (U. S. 1945).
7. See 52 F. Supp. 362,364 (S.D. N.Y. 1943).
8. Pursuant to Rule 56 of the FED. R. Civ. P., 43 STAT. 1064 (1934), 23 U. S. C. fol-
lowing § 723c (1940). This rule requires the court, in a proceeding on motion for summary
judgment, to confine its attention to facts which, based upon the pleadings, depozitions,
admissions, and affidavits on file, are undisputed, or as to which the dispute doe5 not raice
any substantial issue. See 52 F. Supp. 362,364 (S. D. N. Y. 1943).
9. 52 F. Supp. 362 (S. D. N. Y. 1943). The special court convened pursuant to the
provisions for expediting the hearing and determination of equity suits brought under the
antitrust acts, with direct appeal as of right to the Supreme Court within 6O days from the
date the final decree is entered. 32 STAT. 823 (1903), as amended 36 STAT. 8M4 (1910), 36
STAT. 1167 (1911), 15 U. S. C. §§ 28-29 (1940); 56 STAT. 193 (1942), 15 U. S. C. § 28 (Supp.
1942). Learned Hand, J., wrote the majority opinion, in which Augustus N. Hand, J., con-
curred. Swan, J. dissented, 52 F. Supp. at 375.
10. By-laws, as amended in 1942 [hereinafter cited as By-laws (1942) ],Art. III, §5 1-3.
11. The fields are morning, evening, and Sunday.
12. By "competitive considerations" is meaht tahing into account the effect of ad-
mitting an applicant upon his ability to compete with established members who operate in
the same city and time-field.
13. 52 F. Supp. 362,373 (S.D. N.Y. 1943).
14. News of spontaneous or local origin; that is, newsworthy events which occur in the
member's district (the territorial e-xtent of which is fixed by AP's board of directors) without
"deliberate and individual enterprise" on the part of any employee of the member news-
paper. See By-laws (1942), Art. VIII, § 4.
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sion restrictions.15 Likewise, AP's contract with Canadian Press, by which
AP and its members secured exclusive rights in this country to the news
reports of the only comprehensive news service in Canada, was declared to
be but collaterally illegal.' 6 These latter two were enjoined conditionally,
pending revision by AP of its membership by-laws. 17 No attempt to monop-
olize was found.' This decree was affirmed in all particulars by the Supreme
Court.'
An adjudication under the Sherman Act as to the competitive effects of
the by-laws of a press association would seem to require 1) an analysis of the
market in which they operate: the comparative and absolute size and im-
portance of the rival associations in the industry, their relations to each
other, to their respective subscribers and rejectees, and to the reading pub-
lic; 2) an inquiry into the degree to which these relationships have been
affected by the restrictions embodied in the defendant association's by-laws;
and 3) a determination of the forms of relief which the antitrust law provides.
Probably the outstanding condition of existence for a daily newspaper
today is access to at least one comprehensive news service." Pressures of
time render it literally impossible for any newspaper single-handedly to
secure rapid, reliable, and efficient coverage and transmission service from
all parts of the world. Thus, unless possessed of a sizeable independent
fortune,21 an entrepreneur simply will not launch a newspaper without
assurance of access to the requisite news-gathering facilities. Of the three
leading news agencies in the United States, United Press and International
News Service,22 organized for profit, are prepared to sell their reports to any
15. 52 F. Supp. 362,374 (S. D. N. Y. 1943).
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid. See Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring, 65 Sup. Ct. 1416, 1426 (U. S. 1945).
19. 65 Sup. Ct. 1416, 1425-6 (U. S. 1945). Mr. Justice Black wrote the majority
opinion, Justices Douglas and Frankfurter concurring in separate opinions. Dissents were
written by Justices Murphy and Roberts. The Chief Justice joined in the opinion of Mr.
Justice Roberts.
20. See International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U. S. 215 (1918); Asso-
ciated Press v. National Labor Relations Board, 301 U. S. f03 (1937); R. W. DES31OND, TimE
PRESS AND WORLD AYFAIRS (1937) cc. I-III.
21. The only conspicuous recent attempt was made by Marshall Field, who, in Deceni-
ber 1941, founded The Chicago Sun, and, without AP service, developed it into one of the
64 newspapers in the United States with a circulation of over 50,000. Indeed, in July 1942
its daily circulation was 327,000, its Sunday circulation over 400,000. For an account of The
Sun's problems in obtaining adequate press services, particularly during the first few months
of its existence, of its filing of a complaint against AP in February 1942, and of the reactions
to the Government's move in bringing suit against AP in August 1942, see M. FIELD, F Rng-
Dofi Is MORE THAN A WORD (1945) 122-8, 136-146.




newspaper publisher,a but AP, the largest of the three agencies,2 1 Eerves its
members exclusively. 25
AP's dominance in the field is indicated by almost any standard of com-
parison. In 1941 it served 1247 newspapers in this country, to UP's 981.3
Of 110 morning dailies with a circulation of more than 25,000, 107 were AP
members while only 62 were subscribers to UP. Approximately 100,000
people contributed to the gathering of news received by AP as compared
with UP's 2,855 employees; AP had 290,000 miles of leased vres as against
176,000 operated by UP; and had an annual budget of S12,000,000 as com-
pared with UP's budget of $7,000,000.- AP's preeminence as to domestic
coverage is generally conceded, but there is a difference of opinion concern-
ing the relative merits of their foreign services.' 3
There was no suggestion, in the instant suit, that AP achieved or is main-
taining this position of prominence by eliminating rivals or controlling their
business practices. On the contrary, the net practical result of AP's by-laws
is to keep its news services from all non-member publishers, thereby stimu-
lating subscriptions to UP and INS services.2 The instant scheme, however,
by allowing existing publisher-members to block the access of competitors
to a large and desirable segment of the news market, seems similar in its
effects to others held illegal under the Sherman Act. '9
23. UP and INS enter into "asset-value" contracts with their subscribers, the aczst-
value being a specified sum which "competing" newspapers, desirous of securing UP or INS
news, must pay to a newspaper in the same city and field which already holds ouch a con-
tract. See 52 F. Supp. 362,366-7 (S. D. N. Y. 1943).
24. ". . . AP is a vast, intricately reticulated, organization, the largest of its hind,
gathering news from all over the world, the chief single source of news for the American
press, universally agreed to be of prime consequence." 52 F. Supp. 362, 373 (S. D. N. Y.
1943).
25. By-laws (1942), Art. VII, § 4. By the terms of its by-laws, the association is a
clearing house for both the news which its staff gathers and the local news contributed by the
staffs of its members. Id., Art. VIII, §§ 3-4. AP obtains much of its domestic news from its
94 news bureaus located throughout the United States, and from its "string" (part-time)
correspondents. Foreign news is secured from its foreign news bureaus, from foreign news
agencies with whom AP has entered into reciprocal contracts for the e.%change of nems
reports, and from its foreign string correspondents.
26. Serving only 338 newspapers in 1941, and trailing the other two agencies in every
activity relating to news collection and distribution, INS may be eliminated from compara-
tive discussion. As part of the King Features Syndicate it is important in the industry, but
its own ("straight") news services do not approach in scope or value thosz of AP or UP.
27. 52 F. Supp. 362,366-7 (S. D. N.Y. 1943).
28. This is reflected by the fact that more than 300 newspapers, including most of the
leading ones, are both members of AP and subscribers to UP. 52 F. Supp. 362, 367 (S. D.
N.Y. 1943).
29. See 52 F. Supp. 362,365-6 (S.D. N.Y. 1943).
30. Compare Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 193 U. S. 38 (1904); Fashion Originator.'
Guild, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 312 U. S. 457 (1941); Eastern States Retail
Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U. S. 600 (1914). See cases cited in 65 Sup. Ct.
1416, 1424 (U. S. 1945). It seems doubtful that the Assoriatcd Press case will have a vide
application to ordinary business situations, since the coiperative structure of AP is not a
usual form of organization.
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AP's by-laws provided the framework within which the restrictive and
exclusionary practices complained of in this suit were carried out. The by-
laws on voting requirements for admission are framed in the alternative,
depending upon whether or not the applicant is competing or is likely to
compete with existing members. Thus, if there is no existing member in the
city and field, or if all members in that city and field have waived their
rights, 31 request by a newspaper for AP membership is followed by a simple
vote of the directors. But if there is a member in the applicant's city and
field and he has not waived his rights, approval must be demonstrated by a
majority vote of the "regular" members 32 at a membership meeting. It is
this provision which has always operated, and under the 1942 amendments 11
had continued to operate, to empower a member to block the application of
competitors. Concerted negative voting, whenever a single member registers
his desire to keep out a competitor-applicant, stems from an awareness by
the other members that at some future time a competitor of theirs may
apply for admission. 34 This restrictive result has been further assured by
the provisions of the by-laws which grant additional voting power to mem-
bers holding AP bonds.35
31. Where a newspaper publisher purchases an existing AP franchise in a city, none of
the standards or procedures are brought into play: his newspaper is admitted automatically
without even having to make formal application. By-laws (1942), Art. II, § 3. Marshall
Field tried, without success, to purchase the morning AP franchise of The Chicago Herald-
American in December, 1941. See FIELD, op. cit. supra note 21, at 127-8.
32. As contrasted with "associate," or non-voting members. By-laws (1942), Arts. 11,
VII, VIII, XI, XV. For a summary of the differences between regular and associate mem-
bers, see 52 F. Supp. 362,365 (S. D. N. Y. 1943).
33. The 1942 amendments, which formed the basis of this suit, established a majority
vote, 10% assessment payment (see infra note 36), and relinquishment of exclusive rights to
other news or news picture services, as requirements for admission to AP whenever an
existing member exercised his "right of protest" to the application of a publisher who was
actually or potentially his competitor. See 65 Sup. Ct. 1416, 1420 (U. S. 1945).
In 1900 when AP was incorporated under Illinois laws, its by-laws gave stockholding
members an unconditional veto over membership applicants within a 60-mile radius. Mem-
bers at that time were forbidden, subject to fine and suspension, to receive news from, or
furnish news to, persons or firms declared to be "antagonistic" by AP's board of directors.
See Inter-Ocean Publishing Co. v. Associated Press, 184 Ill. 438, 443, 56 N. E. 822, 823
(1900); V. ROSEWATER, HISTORY OF C06PERATIVE NEws-GATHERING IN THE UNITrD
STATEs (1930) c. XXI.
34. This is analogous to Senatorial courtesy. For an analysis of the compelling con-
siderations involved, see 52 F. Supp. 362, 370 (S. D. N. Y. 1943).
During the years 1900-1942, 95% of all applicants under such circumstances were re-
jected. In contrast, for the ten-year period 1932-42, 95% of those applying were elected
where there was no member paper in that city and field or where the members affected
waived their protest rights. Brief for the United States, p. 26, Associated Press et al. v.
United States, 65 Sup. Ct. 1416 (U. S. 1945).
35. The by-laws grant one vote to each regular member because of his membership and
one additional vote for each $25 of AP bonds registered in his name and held by him (pro-
vided he files with- AP's Secretary a waiver of his claim to interest thereon), up to $1,000.
By-laws (1942), Art. XII, § 3. Specified limitations, however, prevent all members from
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Beyond the voting procedures, the by-laws set two further conditions
precedent to membership. First, the elected applicant must pay to AP a
sum equal to ten percent of the total regular assessments paid since Octo-
ber 1, 1900, by the members in his city and field.- This sum is then dis-
tributed among such members in proportion to assessments paid.rr No
payment is exacted if there is no established member in the applicant's city
and field, although such an applicant becomes entitled, on admission, to a
share in AP's capital assets. Secondly, the applicant must undertake to sur-
render the exclusive character of any news or news-picture service he may
be subscribing to, a condition which was apparently not considered illegal;
and further, a competing member may insist that the applicant obtain such
owning an equal amount of bonds. Thus in 1942 out of 1247 members, only 99-including
most of those in the large cities-held sufficient bonds to entitle them to the maximum num-
ber of votes. These totaled more than 50% of the outstanding bonds and gave the 99 almozt
80% of the membership's total voting capacity. S2 F. Supp. 362,366 (S. D. N. Y. 1943); 65
Sup. Ct. 1416,1419 n. 2 (U. S. 1945).
36. 52 F. Supp. 362,365 (S.D. N.Y. 1943).
There is a startling contrast between the amounts payable under the UP "aset-value"
system (see supra, note 23) and under the AP scheme. "The 'asset-value' of 6x of the UP
contracts was under $10,000; of twenty it was between $10,000 and $20,000; of fifteen, be-
tween $20,000 and $30,000; of six, between $30,000 and $40,000; of four, between 40,000
and $50,000; of one, between $50,000 and $60,000; and of one, between 060,000 and $70,000."
52 F. Supp. 362,367 (S.D. N.Y. 1943). Compare the following figures on AP admision fees:
Mornings and Sunday Erering
New York $324,333.82 $575,003.49
Chicago 334,250.46 342,310.35
Detroit 152,789.68 154,606.86
Los Angeles 228,126.82 134,709.80






Washington, D. C. 118,930.08 88,293.20
Initial Cost of Admission to AP for Newspaper Publishers in the Leading American Cities
Under the Ten Percent Assessment Rule. Table computed by the Department of Justice,
printed in 52 F. Supp. 362,367 (S. D. N. Y. 1943).
37. The directors are empowered to apportion among the members the epenses of
news collection and distribution, and to levy assessments against them. By-laws (1942),
Art. IX, § 1. The apportionment is based upon the population of the area within which the
newspaper circulates. Where there is more than one member in the rame city and field the
expenses are shared equally, irrespective of the newspapers' differing circulations. A:=ezs-
ments are payable weekly and in advance, and for delay in payment the directors may
impose a fine of $1,000 or suspend a member (news service to a member is discontinued
during periods of suspension), with no right of appeal against such action. By-laws (1942),
Art. IX, § 2; Art. X, §§ 1, 2, 5. Assessments may also be levied in order to accumulate a
surplus fund. Id., Art. IX, § 1.
The directors are elected by the regular members, under the same Echeme for rewarding
AP bondholders as prevails in voting on applicants for membership. 65 Sup. Ct. 1416, 1419
n. 2 (U. S. 1945).
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service for him on the same terms as it is available to the applicant. The
latter condition, as well as the initial payment scheme, was held to violate
Section 1 of the Sherman Act.Ms
The vague, inclusive quality of the Sherman Act's key phrases has im-
posed upon the courts from the outset the burden of defining the scope of
their application to powerful combinations and abusive practices." The
very generality of their language, however, has ensured their adaptability
in solving the problem of widely divergent industries,40 and under "the rule
of reason" some less uncertain common law concepts have been utilized in
appraising the extent of restraint and the responsibilities of business units
to competitors and the public.4' In this process it has been recognized that
"questions of reasonableness are necessarily questions of relation and de-
gree." 42 To provide effective accommodation to specific cases, whenever a
combination has been declared illegal and ordered to be restrained or dis-
solved, the court painstakingly has sought to make its mandate the resultant
of the equities and the economic realities of the industry under considera-
tion.43 Mr. Justice Black, in the instant case, showed a realistic appreciation
of the strength and weakness of the rule of reason by phrasing his opinion
in terms of competition and the operative forces in the news market, and
by basing his judgment upon the specific by-laws complained of and their
impact upon non-member newspaper publishers.
44
On the other hand, Judge Learned Hand's majority opinion in the lower
38. 52 F. Supp. 362, 371 (S. D. N.Y. 1943).
39. See 52 F. Supp. 362, 370, 373 (S. D. N. Y. 1943). The academic authorities for this
statement are legion. See, e.g., HAMILTON AND TILL, TNEC REP., ANTI-TRUsT IN ACTION,
Monograph 16 (1940) 6, 8-9; H. W. LAIDLER, CONCENTRATION OF CONTROL IN AMERICAN
INDUSTRY (1931) 407; HANDLER, TNEC REP., A STUDY OF THE CONSTRUCTION AND EN-
FORCEMENT OF THE FEDERAL ANTI-TRUST LAWS, Monograph 38 (1941) 2-3; W. H. TAFT,
TiE ANTI-TRUST ACT AND THE SUPREME COURT (1914) c. 2.
40. See HAMILTON and TILL, op. cit. supra note 39, at 74.
41. For an instructive summary of the status of the Sherman Act up to 1904, see Mr.
Justice Harlan's majority opinion in Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197
(1904). The common law influefice upon the language and spirit of the Sherman Act is
described in A. H. WALKER, HISTORY OF THE SHERMAN LAW (1910) 47-62. For the history
of the rule of reason, see HANDLER, op. cit. suprac note 39, at 3-9. This norm seems to be in
judicial favor today in the federal courts. The principal case is illustrative of this fact, for all
five opinions in the Supreme Court purported to rest upon it.
There is an excellent bibliography on the effects of Standard Oil Co. of N. J. v. United
States, 221 U. S. 1 (1911), and United States v. American Tobacco Co,, 221 U. S. 106 (1911)
in 2 WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY (1928) 734, n, 1.
42. Chief Justice Hughes, speaking for the majority in The Sugar Institute, Inc. v.
United States, 297 U. S. 553, 600 (1936).
43. For the varying judicial applications of the rule of reason to American industry,
see the cases cited and discussed in HANDLER, op. cit. supra note 39.
See TAFT, op. cit. supra note 39, at 63, 65-6 for a demonstration that the alternating
endorsement and discarding of the rule of reason has not affected the substantive outcome
of any case decided under the Sherman Act. Taft insists that the common law norm was
applied even in those instances where it was articulately rejected.
44. 65 Sup. Ct. 1416 (U. S. 1945).
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court and Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in the Supreme
Court both rested their conclusions upon the special public interest in, and
dependence upon, diversity in the assemblage, interchange, and distribution
of news.45 Under such an interpretation of "the rule of reason," courts
would look beyond the industry's economic structure into its "public func-
tion," and prescribe in this light the rules of its activity. A number of recent
writings have suggested that this principle be given wider currency in suits
to regulate restrictive practices and combinations in certain fields.3 Con-
sideration of the public nature of the enterprise and commodity involved
admittedly influences a judicial conclusion as to the legality of a particular
"evil." But it seems an historical oversimplification to regard the Sherman
Act as giving the courts, so long as they speak in the name of the general
welfare, full discretion to impose special standards of conduct on particular
industries. If any legislative intent may be inferred from the provisions of
the Act and the contemporary debates thereon, it was to identify the public
interest with the protection of full and untrammeled competition as the
45. " . . even if this were a case of the ordinary kind: the production of fungible
goods, like steel, machinery, clothes or the like, it would be a nice question whether the hand-
icap upon those excluded from the combination, should prevail over the claim of the mem-
bers to enjoy the fruits of their foresight, industry and sagacity. But in that event the only
interest we should have to weigh against that of the members would be the interest of the
excluded newspapers. However, neither exclusively, nor even primarily, are the interests of
the newspaper industry conclusive; for that industry serves one of the most vital of all gen-
eral interests: the dissemination of news from as many different sources, and with as many
different facets and colors as is possible. ....
"... to deprive a paper of the benefit of any service of the first rating is to deprive the
reading public of means of information which it should have; it is only by cross-lights from
varying directions that full illumination can be secured." 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S. D. N. Y.
1943).
"... in addition to being a commercial enterprise, it [AP] has a relation to the public
interest unlike that of any other enterprise pursued for profit .... Truth and understand-
ing are not wares like peanuts or potatoes. And so, the incidence of restratnts upon the
promotion of truth through denial of access to the basis for understanding calls into play
considerations very different from comparable restraints in a couperative enterprise having
merely a commercial aspect. ... The interest of the public is to have the flow of news not
trammeled by the combined self-interest of those who enjoy a unique constitutional position
precisely because of the public dependence on a free press." 65 Sup. Ct. 1416, 1423 (U. S
1945).
But Mr. Justice Murphy invoked this fact to justify an opposite result. 65 Sup. Ct.
1416, 1439 (U. S. 1945).
46. See, especially, Mr. Justice Frankfurter's majority opinion in National Broadcast-
ing Co., Inc. v. United States, 319 U. S. 190, 225-6 (1943) (hdd, the FCC may, through
denial of broadcasting licenses to offending broadcasting stations, regulate and outlaw
monopolistic contracts and understandings between stations and network companies when
these violate the antitrust laws; such practices are to be tested by considerations of "public
interest, convenience, or necessity").
Applied to the principal case, this position logically leads to the "equal access to news"
principle set forth in several of the briefs. The result to AP of adopting this principle would
be identical to that demanded by public utility proponents (see p. 000 infra): the difference
is solely one of legal route.
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sine qua non of all commercial activity. 7 By marking differences of degree
in the enforcement of the competitive principle, the "public interest"
concept would seem to go beyond the policy of the Sherman Act and to
introduce an additional variable into an already complicated formula for
the public control of business.
Nor would it have been any more apposite, as some writers suggest, 48 to
class the newspaper industry with common carriers, innkeepers, warehouse-
men, and wharfingers 19 as among the "public callings" respecting which the
common law imposed the obligation to serve all who apply on equal terms
and at a reasonable price."0 Indeed, if the common law is to be the frame of
reference, it should be borne in mind that under the common law private
property was zealously protected, and hence property rights were granted
liberally in the products of one's creative imagination, sagacity, or effort. 1
47. See, e.g., W. W. THORNTON, COMBINATIONS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE (1928) cc. 1, 2;
WALKER, op. cit. supra note 41; TAFT, op. cit. supra note 39; HAMILTON and TILL, op. cit.
supra note 39.
48. See, e.g., Small, Anti Trust Laws and Public Callings: The Associated Press Case
(1944) 23 N. C. L. REv. 1, 20. The author suggests that AP be required to furnish its news
services to all who desire them and are willing to pay a reasonable price therefor. Mention
is made of the fact that Arkansas, Kansas, Kentucky, Nebraska, Tennessee, and Utah have
imposed by statute this public calling duty upon all corporations and associations dispensing
news.
In Inter-Ocean Publishing Co. v. Associated Press, 184 I1. 438, 56 N. E. 822 (1900),
the Supreme Court of Illinois held that AP was a "business affected with a public interest"
within the doctrine of Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 (1876), and that it must furnish its
news on fair and equal terms to all applicants willing to pay a reasonable rate therefor. The
Inter-Ocean case graphically illustrates the inadequacy of State regulation of large enter-
prise. For following the drastic pronouncement of the Illinois Court, AP merely dissolved
the Illinois incorporated organization and, transferring its assets, incorporated as a non-
profit membership association in New York with the avowed purpose of employing the same
practices and accomplishing the same results as were enjoined by the Illinois decree. See
ROSEWATER, op. cit. supra note 33, cc. XXI, XXII. For a similar instance, see Standard Oil
Co. of N. J. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1, 38-42 (1911).
49. See Burdick, The Origin of the Peculiar Duties of Public Service Companies (1911) 11
COL. L. REv. 514, 616, 743; Arterburn, The Origin and First Test of Public Callings (1927)
75 U. OF PA. L. REV. 411.
Mr. Justice Roberts argued in his dissent that it was impossible to find support for a
conclusion that AP was guilty of monopoly or unreasonable restraint and asserted that the
public utility notion was what really motivated the majority, regardless of the grounds upon
which they articulately based their decision. 65 Sup. Ct. 1416, 1436 (U. S. 1945). Judge
Swan, dissenting below, charged that the court had enjoined AP's by-laws simply because it
believed "that a news gathering organization as large and efficient as AP is engaged in a
public calling, and so under a duty to admit 'all qualified applicants on equal terms.' " 52 F.
Supp. 362, 375 (S. D. N. Y. 1943).
50. A good summary of the arguments for treating AP like a public utility is found in
Mr. Justice Brandeis' dissent in International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U. S.
215, 263-7 (1918). Compare Inter-Ocean Publishing Co. v. Associated Press, 184 II. 438,
56 N. E. 822 (1900), with Matthews v. Associated Press of the State of New York, 136 N. Y.
333, 32 N. E. 981 (1893).
51. For historical and critical discussion of this topic, see Comment (1938) 48 YALE
L. J. 288; Comment (1934) 47 HARv. L. REV. 1419.
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The defendants relied upon the First Amendment to avoid the conse-
quences of their conduct. 52 But it should be apparent that the decree has
no tendency to interfere with the editorial policies of any newspaper or to
discourage individual discretion in editing, coloring, accentuating, or ex-
cluding particular news events.53 It aims simply at furthering a wider dis-
semination of news reports by eliminating a specific trade restraint, thereby
emphasizing that newspaper agencies enjoy no special constitutional im-
munity when their business practices violate applicable federal law.s. The
natural tendency of the decree is to promote the freedom of the press, if it
be conceded that one manifestation of that freedom is the infusion of new
blood into the newspaper industry. Charges of intent to "shackle" the
press 54 and analogy to press controls in totalitarian countries -5 seem, there-
fore- alarmist. The "clear and present danger" doctrine appears equally
irrevelant. For neither a specific utterance nor a prior restraint was at
issue,-" but rather a group of business practices reflecting a policy which
demanded judicial appraisal in terms of the spirit of the Sherman Act.
Apart from retention of jurisdiction by the District Court,"' the final
decree authorized no special means for overseeing the future entrance re-
quirements of AP. Thus only the two traditional weapons vould remain for
that purpose: publisher-applicants excluded for competitive reasons could
now appropriately have recourse to triple-damage suits-3 for all the services
52. The objective of the constitutional protection of the press is set forth in the leading
case of Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233, 250 (1936): "The predominant pur-
pose of the grant of immunity here invoked was to preserve an untrammeled press as a vital
source of public information."
53. "The effect of our judgment will be, not to restrict AP members as to what they
shall print, but only to compel them to make their dispatches accesible to others." 52 F.
Supp. 362,374 (S. D. N. Y. 1943).
54. At the close of his elaborate dissent, Mr. Justice Roberts says: "The decree .
threatens to be but a first step in the shackling of the press, which will subvert the constitu-
tional freedom to print or to withhold, to print as and how one's reason or one's interest
dictates .... It is not protecting a freedom but confining it to prescribe where and how
and under what conditions one must impart the literary product of his thought and re-
search." 65 Sup. Ct. 1416, 1437 (U. S. 1945).
55. "The tragic history of recent years demonstrates far too well how despotic govern-
ments may interfere with the press and other means of communication in their efforts to
corrupt public opinion and to destroy individual freedom.... Proof of the justification and
need for the use of the Sherman Act to . . .remove unreasonable impediments from the
channels of news distribution should therefore be clear and unmistakeable." Mr. Justice
Murphy, dissenting, 65 Sup. Ct. 1416,1439 (U. S. 1945).
56. See Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252, 261-3 (1941); 65 Sup. Ct. 1416, 1418
(U. S. 1945).
57. From the date the District Court entered final judgment, AP was given 120 days
in which to make its membership by-laws conform to the provisions of the decree. 2 F.
Supp. 362, 375 (S. D. N. Y. 1943). The District Court retained the cause so that if dis-
crimination against competitors of AP members continued after the by-laws vere modified,
it would be able to grant appropriate supplemental relief to realize in full the provisions and
general purpose of the decree. Ibid.
58., Section 7 of the Sherman Act provides: "Any person who shall b injured in his
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AP has refused to make available from the date when application for mem-
bership first was made; and either such rejectees or the Department of
Justice may bring an action for contempt of the decree if AP continues its
long-standing policy toward "competing" applicants. Should these remedies
prove unavailing or inadequate to prevent discriminatory restraints against
non-member newspapers, the government could, of course, institute a new
antitrust action in the hope that a full-dress trial might yield broader re-
sults.
At a recent special membership meeting the regular members elected four
publisher-applicants 19 and approved a series of amendments designed to
bring the by-laws into accord with the mandate of the lower court."O The
revised by-laws affirmatively declare that no member or director shall take
into account, in voting upon an applicant for membership, the effect of his
admission to AP upon his ability to compete with existing members in the
same city and field.6 '
The new by-laws are silent concerning two of the important issues in the
case: relinquishment of exclusive news rights to other services and initial
payments. But one of the amended sections requires that before an elected
applicant may enjoy the rights of membership he must not only agree to be
bound by the by-laws, but also must enter into a written contract with AP
business or property by any other person or corporation by reason of anything forbidden
or declared to be unlawful by this act, may sue therefor in any district court of the United
States in the' district in which the defendant resides or is found, without respect to the
amount in controversy, and shall recover three fold the damages by him sustained, and the
costs of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." 26 STAT. 210 (1890). Cf. 38 STAT. 731
(1914); 15 U. S. C. § 15 (1940).
59. The Chicago Sun and The Washington Times-Herald have been publicly asso-
ciated with the present suit, having had their applications rejected at the annual member-
ship meeting in April 1942. The other two applicants, the Oakland Post-Enquirer and the
Detroit Times, though never having sought entrance before, are likewise located in large
cities. All four newspapers were admitted by an overwhelming majority. See N. Y. Times,
Nov. 29, 1945, p. 1, col. 2 and p. 20, col. 2.
The most dramatic aspect of the members' action at this meeting was the election of
Marshall Field, whose efforts to obtain AP service had been resisted vigorously for almost
four years. N. Y. Herald Tribune, Nov. 29, 1945, p. 22, cols. 6-7. From the statements
made just before the balloting took place, it seems evident that he was successful on this
occasion principally because AP's lawyers were convinced that a negative vote would con-
stitute a contempt of court. N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1945, p. 20, col. 5.
The Chicago Sun had requested merely associate membership because an existing con-
tract required that it furnish its local news to UP. "Mr. Field had explained . . . that he
was interested only in getting the news report of the AP and was not concerned with voting
rights and other privileges that are granted to regular members, but not to associate mem-
bers . . .' Id. at col. 4.
60. N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1945, p. 1, col. 2; N. Y. Herald Tribune, Nov. 29, 1945, p. 22,
col. 6. The directors took this opportunity to introduce a great number of other changes into
the by-laws [hereinafter cited as By-laws (1945) 1, most of which only condense or unsub-
stantially alter the former wording, in order to adjust their provisions to AP's current
operations.
61. By-laws (1945), Art. II, § 7.
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which will specify the news services to be furnished, the uses to which the
member may put them, and any other terms and conditions which the di-
rectors may see fit to prescribe. 2 In view of the directors' plenary power
over the levy of assessments, 3 it is possible this provision will be the means
for continuing a scheme of initiation payments. However, it seems clear
from the opinion of the District Court that any payments exacted will have
to approximate the acquired share in AP's capital assets, and there is a
strong implication that they may not be distributed by AP among member-
competitors of the successful applicant as compensation for the resulting
loss in value of their membership."c
As the subjective issue of motive is made the touchstone of legality in
AP's future membership policy, the decree may encounter difficulties of en-
forcement. While it might seem that AP members still have vde latitude in
the process of selection among applicants, as a practical matter there remain
few criteria that could be employed consistently with the decree; political
grounds and journalistic standards might perhaps be invoked5P But what-
ever reasons may be given, the possibility that competitive considerations
undercut the stated criteria makes it likely that the District Court will care-
fully examine particular exclusions and conditions upon admission, to test
their compliance with the present decision. Since the future membership
policy of AP, rather than the phraseology of its by-laws or the fate of four
individual applicants, is the core of the case, it would seem that the District
Court can best insure compliance with the decree by indefinitely retaining
jurisdiction."6
62. By-laws (1945), Art. II, § S. "The terms of the proposed fixed-term contracts have
not been definitively decided upon as yet." Communication to YALE L.w JounxAL from
John T. Cahill, counsel for AP, Dec. 18, 1945. The reason assigned by the direntora for in-
augurating a system of individual membership contracts was to claify and fortify relationa
between AP and its members in order to achieve more fully AP's prime purpose of furnishing
an impartial news report. See N. Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1945, p. 20, col 4.
63. By-laws (1942), Art. IX, § 1; By-laws (1945), Art. VI, § 3.
64. See 52 F. Supp. 362,371 (S. D. N.Y. 1943).
65. Such exclusion would probably be defended in terms of the "disreputable" or
"subversive" purposes of the newspaper, or its "radical" editorial policies. Itis worth noting
that the present membership of AP comprehends almost the entire gamut of representative
political persuasions in the United States. It seems clear that AP might exclude applicants
who were not up to journalistic standards of honesty in reporting or who did not conduct a
bona fide newspaper.
66. AP has announced it will petition the District Court for relinquishment of its
continuous jurisdiction over the cause. See Report of AP's directors, as reprinted in N. Y.
Times, Nov. 29, 1945, p. 20, cos. 3-6, at col. 6. "It is inconceivable to the board of direc-
tors, as it must be to the whole membership, that the Associated Press or any similar or-
ganization engaged in the coaperative collection of news should attempt to operate under
permanent injunction of the courts." Ibid.
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STATE REGULATION OF LABOR UNIONS*
FOLLOWING the passage of the Wagner Act,' ten states 2 enacted similar
and supplementary legislation protecting the right of collective bargaining
for employees of intrastate businesses. But the inevitable reaction to labor's
political and legal ascendency 3 has recently produced an even larger crop
of state legislation, 4 not to be confused I with the above, which purports to
regulate all labor unions operating within the state, whether or not engaged
in intrastate commerce.
These statutes are all founded on the state police power and vary in
content from a simple prohibition against violence in picketing 0 to a com-
plete prohibition of picketing.7 Largely inspired by anti-union sentiment, S
they are opposed by labor.' Their provisions are broadly of two types,
* Hill v. Florida, 65 Sup. Ct. 1373 (U. S. 1945).
1. 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 151 (1940).
2. In 1937: MAss. STAT. ANN. (Michie, Supp. 1944) c. 15OA; N. Y. LABOR LAW § 700;
PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1941) tit. 43, § 211.1 (amending Pa. Public Laws (1937) 1168);
UTAH CODE ANN. (1943) tit. 49, c. 1; Wis. STAT. (1943) c. 111 (substituted WIs. STAT. (1937)
c. 111). In successive years other states followed suit MICH. STAT. ANN. (Henderson, Supp.
1945) § 17.454(1); MIN. STAT. (Mason, Supp. 1940) § 4254-21; R. I. Acts and Resolves
1941, c. 1066; CoLO. STAT. ANN. (Michie, Supp. 1944) c. 97, § 94(1); Conn. Acts 1945, c. --
approved and effective April 17, 1945.
3. See Dodd, The Supreme Court and Organized Labor, 1941-1945 (1945) 58 HARv. L.
REv. 1018, 1061; Dodd, Some State Legislatures Go to War-On Labor Unions (1944) 29
IOWA L. Rv. 148; Villard, Why Unions Must be Regulated (1944) 58 AMERICAN MERCURY
667.
4. ALA. CODE (Supp. 1943) tit. 26, § 376; ARK. STAT. (Pope, Supp. 1944) 691; CAL.
LABOR CODE (Deering, 1943) § 1131; COLO. STAT. ANN. (Michie, Supp. 1944) c. 97, § 94(1)
(incorporation feature has been declared unconstitutional and since inseparably intertwined
with regulatory measures they are also inoperative. A. F. of L. v. Reilly, 13 Lab. Rel. Rep.
105 (Colo. Dist. Ct. 1943)); FLA. STAT. Am. (Supp. 1944) § 481 (hereinafter cited as session
laws, Fla. Laws 1943, c. 21968); Idaho Laws 1943, c. 76; KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. (Corrick,
Supp. 1943) c. 44, § 801 (section 809 (3, 12, 13) has been declared unconstitutional. Staple-
ton v. Mitchell, 60 F. Supp. 51 (D. Kan. 1945)); MASS. STAT. ANN. (Michie, Supp. 1944) c.
149, § 150B; MINN. STAT. (Mason, Supp. 1944) § 4254-21; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1941)
tit. 43, § 211.6; S. D. Laws 1943, c. 86; TEX. ANN. REV. CIV. STAT. (Vernon, Supp. 1945)
Art. 5154a; Wis. STAT. (1943) c. 111, § 111.06.
5. The anti-labor provisions are in some instances to be found in the State Labor
Relations Acts themselves. See for example amended and substituted acts of Pennsylvania
and Wisconsin respectively, cited supra note 2, specifying unfair employee labor practices.
6. Wis. STAT. (1943) c. 111, § 111.06(2f).
7. Idaho Laws 1943, c. 76, § 3.
8. Milner and Brissenden, Union Regulation by the States (1943) 108 Nrw REPUBLIC
790; Roberts, Union-Busting in Kansas (1943) 108 NEw REPUBLIC 443; Taper, Dixie Drive
on Labor (1942) 154 NATION 569; Villard, op. cit. supra note 3; Business Week, March 27,
1943, p. 101, ("A severe antiunion measure. .. ").
9. Business Week, May 29, 1943, p. 105, quotes William L. Green's advice to state
federations to "refrain from complying with recently enacted antilabor legislation in these
[Tex., Ark., S. D., Idaho, Kan., Colo.] states."
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1) those curtailing the privilege to strike 10 and picket,11 and 2) those of a
regulatory nature requiring licensing and registration of agents and unions,
12
disclosure of union financial matters,13 and regulation of union internal
affairs.
14
The increase in union power subsequent to the Wagner Act 1" has raised
economic and social problems which, it has been argued,1" should be met
with some measure of public control. Generally the type of legislation
advocated is that which contains provisions to safeguard union funds from
embezzlement, guarantee a more democratic process in union elections, make
unions more easily amenable to process, and protect members and non-
members from discrimination at the hands of a sole bargaining representa-
tive.17 If it is recognized that this type of regulation is desirable, it seems
10. Authorization of a strike requires a majority vote by union membership in six
states. ALA. CODE (Supp. 1943) tit. 26, § 388; COLO. STAT. Am;. (Michie, Supp. 1944) c. 97,
§ 94(6)2e; Fla. Laws 1943, c. 21968, § 9(3); K.AN. GEN. STAT. A.m,;. (Corrick, Supp. 1943)
c. 44, § 809(3); Minm. STAT. (Mason, Supp. 1944) § 4254-31(h); Wis. STAT. (1943) c. 111,
§ 111.06(2c).
11. Picketing in agricultural employment is completely prohibited by Idaho Laws
1943, c. 76, § 3 and S. D. Laws 1943, c. 86, § 3.
12. ALA. CODE (Supp. 1943) tit. 26, § 382; Fla. Laws 1943, c. 21968, §14, 6; K,?;. Guz;.
STAT. Am. (Corrick, Supp. 1943) c. 44, §§ S04-6; Tux. A.m;i. R.v. Civ. STAT. (Vernon,
Supp. 1945) Art. 5154a, §§ 3, 5. COLO. STAT. Am.;N,. (Michie, Supp. 1944) c. 97, § 94(20),
requiring incorporation of unions has been found to be unconstitutional as a violation of the
First and Fourteenth Amendments. See A. F. of L. v. Reilly, loc. cit. supra note 4.
13. ALA. CODE (Supp. 1943) tit. 26, § 382; COLO. STAT. Arm. (Michie, Supp. 1944)
c. 97, § 94(20); Fla. Laws 1943, c. 21968, § 7; Idaho Laws 1943, c. 76, § 1; KIU. Gs;!. STAT.
ANN. (Corrick, Supp. 1943) c. 44, § 806; MILmN. STAT. (Mason, Supp. 1944) § 4254-44; S. D.
Laws 1943, c. 86, § 1; TEx. Am. Rv. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, Supp. 1945) Art. 5154a, § 9.
14. ALA. CODE (Supp. 1943) tit. 26, § 390 prohibits fees for work permits. Section 392
forbids political contributions by unions. Fla. Laws 1943, c. 21963, § 5 restricts the amount
of initiation fees. TEx. Am;. REv. Crv. STAT. (Vernon, Supp. 1945) art. 5154a, § 7 limits
income of unions, section 4 requires elections annually in unions, section 10 deprives union
of final determination in expulsion of members.
15. See supra note 3.
16. See United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 700 (1944). "The scope and nature of the
economic activities of incorporated and unincorporated organizations and their reprecenta-
tives demand that the constitutional power of the federal and state governments to regulate
those activities be correspondingly effective." Ibid. See also Hard, Regulating Urions for
the Common Good (September 1942) 41 R.aDER's DIGEsT 43; Villard, loc. ci. supra note 3 at
670; ". . . there is a preponderant and temperate demand for some measure of reform in
union practice, imposed from without. Wage earners, moreover, joined in the demands in
about the same proportion as the rest of the public." The Fortune Stnnry (February 1944)
29 FORTUNE 94, 112. Some labor leaders are not averse to this type of regulation. See
Villard, supra, at 667.
17. Some progress has been made recently by the Supreme Court in placing more
responsibility on labor organizations in the absence of legislation. In United State v. White,
322 U. S. 694 (1944), the union was made to produce its records for trial. Also in Steele v.
Louisville & Nashville Ry., 323 U. S. 192 (1944), Tunstal v. Brotherhood of Locomotive
Firemen and Enginemen, 323 U. S. 210 (1944) and Railway Mail As'n v. Corsi, 65 Sup. Ct.
1483 (U. S. 1945), the sold bargaining representative %was prevented from discriminating
against non-members
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unfortunate that in these state statutes it should have been so often com-
mingled with anti-union legislation.m
One line of cases, based on the free speech and assembly provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment, has dealt at length with the privilege of peaceful
picketing, which was at first declared, in Thornhill v. Alabamna,19 to be a
proper subject of state regulation only in the face of "clear and present dan-
ger" 20 to civil order, but which has, in subsequent refinements of the Thorn-
hill doctrine, been held subject to reasonable state legislative control even in
the absence of such danger.
2'
Hill v. Florida 22 is the first case to bring before the Supreme Court a labor
statute,23 purely regulatory in nature, which only indirectly affects free
speech and assembly.24 The issue here arose from the attempt of the At-
torney General of Florida to enjoin 25 a labor union 25 and its business agent
from functioning 2 as such until they complied with the licensing and regis-
tration provisions of the Florida statute. Section 4 required the business
agent of a labor union to be licensed by a special board upon the agent's
showing of compliance with certain standards of citizenship and character.23
18. See general summary of provision of these statutes in (1943) 56 MoNT LY LABOR
REv. 941-4 and (1943) 57 MONTHLY LABOR REV. 778-80.
19. 310 U.S. 88 (1940) which held that peaceful picketing is protected by the fourteenth
amendment as a right of free speech.
20. Id. at 105. Cf. Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Board, 237 Wis. 164, 185, 295 N. W. 791, 800 (1941) where the Court said: "The federal act
[NLRA] deals with a situation that has arisen. The state act [Wisconsin Employment
Peace Act, WIs. STAT. (1943) § 111.011 seeks to forestall action which may lead to disorder
and loss of life and property."
21. Carpenters Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U. S. 722 (1942). For a discussion of a
watering down of the Thornill doctrine, see majority opinion of Stapleton v. Mitchell, 60
F. Supp. 51 (D. Kan. 1945).
22. 65 Sup. Ct. 1373 (U.S. 1945).
23. Fla. Laws 1943, c. 21968.
24. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516 (1945) involved the constitutionality of a Texas
Statute, TEx. ANN. REv. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, Supp. 1945) Art. 5154(a), similar to that of
Florida. But the Texas violation having occurred during a public assembly, the majority
opinion in finding an infringement of the right of free speech reads much like a decision
under the Tlwrnhill doctrine.
25. The Attorney General apparently elected to use an injunction to enforce the statute
although other penalties were provided by Section 14 of the Florida Statute, loc. cit. supra
note 23, namely: "Any person or labor organization who shall violate ...this Act, shall
. .be adjudged guilty of a misdemeanor and be punished by a fine not exceeding Five
Hundred Dollars ($500.00) or by imprisonment ... not to exceed six months, or by
both.... ."
26. United Association of Journeymen Plumbers and Steamfitters of United States
and Canada, Local No. 234, affiliated with the American Federation of Labor.
27. The business agent was enjoined from organizing and the union from representing
the employees of the St. John's River Shipbuilding Company of Jacksonville, Florida.
28. Fla. Laws 1943, c. 21968 § 4 provided: "No person shall be granted a license ...
as a business agent in the state of Florida, (1) who has not been a citizen of and has not
resided in the United States of America for a period of more than ten years. . . . (2) Who
has been convicted of a felony. (3) Who is not a person of good moral character, and every
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Section 6 required the union to file an annual report setting forth the loca-
tion of its office and the names of its officers. Both the majority opinion
of the court and the special concurring opinion of Chief Justice Stone viev:ed
the imposition by Section 4 of arbitrary standards for the selection of a
business agent as directly repugnant to the guarantee in the National Labor
Relations Act of labor's complete freedom in the selection of bargaining
representatives. Seven justices concurred in this finding, Frankfurter and
Roberts dissenting on the theory that, since the Wagner Act is not con-
cerned with labor union regulation, Congress had not pre-empted the field
and Florida was "free to deal with these matters." -'
A majority of six justices, with Justice Black as their spokesman, found
that the substantive requirements of Section 6 were not improper, but that a
conflict with the Wagner Act resulted from the sanctions imposed for failure
to comply with these requirements. Since the union had been enjoined by
the state from functioning as a union, it could not bargain collectively with-
out being "liable both to punishment for contempt of court and to conviction
under the misdemeanor section of the act." 31 The strange conclusion ap-
pears to be that Section 6 is valid but the violator cannot be punished, or
at least not in this way. Chief Justice Stone argued that a state may use
any of the conventional sanctions to enforce a valid regulation and that
Supreme Court inquiry should be directly solely to the question of the
validity of the state substantive requirements.32
The question now remains in the form of a triple alternative: whether this
person desiring to act as a business agent .. . shall before doing so obtain a licee . ..
by filing an application under oath therefor with the Secretary of State, accompanied by a
fee of One Dollar. There shall accompany the application a statement ... of the labor
organization for which he proposes to act as agent, showing his authority so to do. The
Secretary of State shall hold such application on file for a period of thirty days during which
time any person may file objections . .f. ter the expiration of the thirty day period,
.. . the Secretary of State shall submit the application, together with all information that
he may have including any objections . . . to a Board to be composed of the Governor as
Chairman, the Secretary of State, and the Superintendent of Education. If a majority of
the Board shall find that the applicant is qualified, pursuant to the terms of this Act and
are of the opinion that the public interest requires that a license or permit should be Lcued
to such applicant, then the Board shall by resolution authorize the Secretary of State to iz:ue
such license or permit, same shall be for the calendar year .. .unless sooner surrendered,
suspended, or revoked"
29. Section 6 provided: "Every labor organization operating in the State of Florida ehall
make a report in writing to the Secretary of State annually .. . in such form as the S-re-
tary of State may prescribe, and shall show the following facts:
(1) The name of the labor organization;
(2) The location of its office;
(3) The name and address of the president, secretary, treasurer, and burinezs agent.
At the time of filing such report it shall be the duty of every such labor organization to
pay the Secretary of State an annual fee therefor in the sum of One Dollar."
30. 65Sup. Ct. 1373, 1383 (U.S. 1945).
31. Id. at 1375.
32. Id. at 1377.
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opinion shall be taken purely on the level of its own internal logic, stressing
the invalidity of a particular sanction; or whether the kind of argument used
here by Justice Black will serve in future cases to invalidate all state regula-
tion of labor unions (excepting, of course, that aimed solely at criminal or
tortious conduct); 33 or whether a more sophisticated analysis would appraise
the Hill case in the light of the well-known anti-labor aura surrounding the
whole Florida statute,3 4 a condition whose absence may in other cases allow a
different result. Though the court gave no indication in the opinion that it
was influenced by the anti-union origin of this statute or that it considered
any sections other than the fourth and sixth, the lack of persuasiveness in the
abstract rationale of the decision suggests that some such tacit considera-
tions underlay the result. For if it is maintained that the Wagner Act makes
it impossible to impose effective sanctions for violation of an otherwise un-
objectionable law, any inquiry as to the substantive propriety of such law be-
comes meaningless. Had the court anathematized the injunction alone there
might be some reason to believe that the less drastic sanctions of imprison-
ment or fine could be used to enforce such statutes. But the majority opinion
states that liability for conviction under the misdemeanor section of the act
is an "obstacle to collective bargaining"; 36 and the language in a companion
case 36 indicates that such penalties cannot be imposed if they will interfere
with the collective bargaining function of a labor union. Any attempt to
imprison union officials under a misdemeanor clause then should logically
meet with the same result as the injunction in the present case.
37
This leaves for consideration only the small statutory fine against the
union or union officials. Of all the sanctions this is probably the only one
which can be enforced and not be labeled an obstacle to collective bargain-
ing. But, as in the case of other penal statutes, for instance, anti-trust 18 and
price control,39 where the benefit derived from illegal action may outweigh
the cost of conviction, a single statutory fine is of little effect as a method of
33. Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 315
U. S. 740 (1941). The Supreme Court sustained section 111.06(2) of the Wisconsin Statute,
loc. cit. supra note 2, which prohibited violence in picketing. The court said that Congress
did not intend to exclude such use of the state police power when it enacted the Wagner Act,
but rendered a narrow opinion anticipating Hill v. Florida when it stated "If the order of
the state Board affected the status of the employees, or if it caused a forfeiture of collective
bargaining rights, a distinctly different question would arise." Id. at 751.
34. See Taper, Dixie Drive on Labor, (1942) 154 NATiO-N 569, and material cited supra
note 8.
35. 65 Sup. Ct. 1373, 1375 (U.S. 1945).
36. Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 65 Sup. Ct. 1384, 1388, 1392
(U. S. 1945) was dismissed for lack of a justiciable dispute with a lengthy opinion. Cf. C.I.O.
v. McAdory, 65 Sup. Ct. 1395 (U. S. 1945).
37. The penalty provision of the Florida statute, loc. cit. supra note 23, is typical of the
other state statutes. Minnesota alone prescribes the injunction; other states impose criminal
penalties averaging from $300 to $500 in fines and from three to six months' imprisonment.
38. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. § 1 (1940).
39. 56 STAT. 33 (1942), 50 U. S. C. § 925 (Supp. 1942).
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enforcement. And the cumulative effect of successive fines on union morale
and finances might be deemed to impair the union's bargaining position and
thus run afoulof the rule in the instant case.
If the ultimate effect of such decisions is to fend off state enactments and
increase the pressure for uniform federal labor legislation, they may have
some merit. There is evidence today of the use of anti-labor laws by some
states as inducements for industry to locate within the state."' If unchecked,
the inevitable result of such legislation will be to deepen the cleavage be-
tween industry and labor as these statutes become progressively more anti-
union to stay in the competition. And the end product wVill be a heteroge-
neous collection of enactments by individual jurisdictions 41 dealing vith a
problem which has been recognized to be of national importance 42 and
capable of national solution within the commerce clause doctrine-43
After Hill v. Florida, it is difficult to see any significant future for existing
regulatory state labor legislation. Exactly what limit can be set to the
argument that such regulation constitutes an "obstacle to collective bar-
gaining" is not clear. The phrase, we have seen, may be applied either to
the substantive provisions of the statute or to the sanction imposed for their
violation. Those provisions which, like Section 4 of the Florida statute,
arbitrarily cut down a federally protected labor privilege, or subject it to
administrative discretion unbounded by legislative standards, are of course
doomed. Those reasonable and well defined provisions which neither require
the disclosure of too much information of use to an employer nor interfere
with the internal affairs of the union beyond securing the rights of members,
are probably not "obstacles to collective bargaining" within the meaning of
the majority opinion and may, in the context of a statute free from anti-
labor pressures in its inception, be upheld regardless of the method of en-
forcement by whittling down the Hill v. Florida holding.
40. See Taper, op. cit. supra note 34; Business Week, June 16,1945, p. 103.
41. Heaney, Labor Relations-A National or a State Proenk (1941) 26 Mn;. L. REv.
359,385; Villard, op. cit. supra note 3 at 670.
42. "The Wagner Act is federal legislation, administered by a national agency, intended
to solve a national problem on a national scale." NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U. S.
111,123 (1944).
43. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp, 301 U. S. 1 (1937); Rottcchaefer, The
Constitvtion and a "Planzed Econtmy' (1940) 38 MicH. L. REv. 1133, 1149-50. Uniform
federal legislation in this field is not unlikely in view of the vacuum left by the instant cae.
And, under the First Amendment, Congress is equally bound with the states to re-lpct
freedorh of speech and assembly.
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